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The Evil Waiter Case
LUIS E. CHIESA*
This essay discusses the “Evil Waiter Case,” a famous hypothetical
fact pattern that has been the subject of much debate in the German,
Spanish, and Latin American criminal law literature, but that unfor-
tunately has not found its way into Anglo-American scholarly writ-
ings. The case presents us with a waiter who notices that the filet
mignon she is taking to her assigned table is covered in a poisoned
mushroom wine sauce. She nevertheless takes the dish to the table.
The patron eats the poisoned filet mignon and dies several minutes
later. Did the evil waiter kill the hungry patron or did she merely let
him die? This essay argues that the evil waiter’s conduct shares mor-
ally relevant features of both actions and omissions, although it is
neither purely active nor purely omissive conduct. It is, for lack of a
better word, an “actmission” that is more blameworthy than a pure
omission but less worthy of condemnation than purely active wrong-
doing. Conduct counts as an actmission if it amounts to a failure to
rescue (e.g. waiter fails to rescue patron) that is accomplished by
engaging in a willed bodily movement (waiter places dish in front of
patron). As a result of the hybrid nature of her conduct, the evil
waiter should be punished more severely than if she had merely
failed to rescue the patron, but less harshly than if she had actively
killed the patron. More importantly, the Evil Waiter Case reveals that
judges should not be forced to describe criminal conduct as either an
act or an omission. Instead, American criminal law ought to recog-
nize “actmissions” as a distinct category of conduct. Such actmis-
sions should be punished more than pure omissions but less than
entirely active conduct. Criminal law would thus be better served by
replacing the act/omission distinction with the act/omission/actmis-
sion tristinction.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The chef at a restaurant rings the bell signaling to the wait staff that
food is ready to be taken to a table. The waiter diligently walks to the
kitchen and picks up the plate. It is an exquisitely prepared filet mignon
with mushroom wine sauce. Alas, something is not quite right with the
dish. The coloration of the mushroom sauce is off. Since the waiter is
pursuing a doctoral degree in biology and chemistry, she quickly con-
cludes that the mushrooms used for the sauce are poisonous toadstools
capable of causing death if consumed by humans. Nevertheless, she
decides to take the dish to the table. She reasons that it is not a waiter’s
job to check food for poisonous substances. Upon reaching the table, she
asks, “who ordered the filet mignon with mushroom wine sauce?” A
hungry patron raises his hand while replying, “me, me!” The waiter gen-
tly places the plate in front of the hungry patron. With a “bon appe´tit,
monsieur,” she leaves the area and goes back to the kitchen to pick up a
dish for a different table. The hungry patron eats the filet mignon. He
dies several minutes later from mushroom poisoning.1
1. The Evil Waiter Case was first proposed by the renowned German criminal law scholar
Gu¨nther Jakobs in his DERECHO PENAL: PARTE GENERAL. See G ¨UNTHER JAKOBS, DERECHO
PENAL: PARTE GENERAL, FUNDAMENTOS Y TEOR´IAS DE LA IMPUTACI ´ON 250–53 (Joaquin Cuello
Contreras & Jose Luis Serrano Gonzalez De Murillo, trans., Marcial Pons 2d ed. 1995) (2d ed.
1991).  I ask the reader to assume that the chef is not at fault for using poisoned mushrooms for
the wine sauce. This is not a necessary assumption, but it is helpful in order to avoid getting
distracted with problems of complicity and allocating responsibility between the different actors
possibly involved in the death of the hungry patron. The reader must also assume that the waiter
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Did the waiter kill the patron or did she merely let him die? More
specifically, is the waiter liable for murdering the patron or for failing to
rescue him? If the correct answer is the former, she will likely be sen-
tenced to a term of imprisonment that may range anywhere from ten
years to life imprisonment depending on the jurisdiction.2 If, however,
the waiter merely failed to rescue the patron, she will not be punished at
all in the vast majority of American jurisdictions.3
This essay argues that current legal rules inappropriately force us to
choose between describing the conduct of the waiter as either an act that
gives rise to murder liability or an omission that gives rise to liability for
failing to rescue. The moral universe is more complicated than this.
Some courses of conduct share morally relevant features of both acts
and omissions. I call such courses of conduct “actmissions” and argue
that their most salient feature is that they are more blameworthy than
omissions but less blameworthy than actions.4 Building upon this theory,
this essay suggests that the conduct of the evil waiter is best described as
an “actmission” that is more blameworthy than a mere failure to rescue
the patron, but less worthy of condemnation than actively killing him.
As a result, the appropriate punishment that should be imposed on the
waiter is less than the punishment authorized for murder, but more than
what is authorized for failures to rescue. This, in turn, exposes an impor-
tant shortcoming in American criminal law. Instead of artificially trying
to force conduct into the “act” or “omission” categories, the interests of
criminal law would be better served by acknowledging that there are
courses of conduct that are partly active and partly omissive and, there-
fore, deserving of less punishment than purely active conduct but more
punishment than entirely passive conduct.
The argument proceeds in two parts. Part II of this essay considers
whether the conduct in the Evil Waiter Case is best described as an act
or an omission. After finding that describing the evil waiter’s conduct as
either an act or an omission is wanting, it is argued that the Evil Waiter
Case presents a course of action that is both active and omissive in mor-
ally relevant ways. Therefore, it presents the signature structure of what
this essay calls an “actmission.”
was able to notice that the mushrooms were poisoned only because he possesses special
knowledge in light of his advanced studies. An average person or waiter would not have noticed
anything wrong with the dish.
2. See, e.g., U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2A1.1–.5 (2011) (outlining base
offense levels for crimes of homicide).
3. See, e.g., Joshua Dressler, Some Brief Thoughts (Mostly Negative) About “Bad
Samaritan” Laws, 40 SANTA CLARA L. Rev. 971, 975 (2000).
4. I first made this claim in Luis E. Chiesa, Actmissions, 116 W. VA. L. REV. 583, 584
(2013).
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Part III of this essay fleshes out the implications that the Evil
Waiter Case has for American criminal law. More specifically, it
explores whether it is best to replace the act/omission distinction with a
sliding scale that allows decision makers to place conduct along a con-
tinuum that goes from fully active to purely passive conduct. Adoption
of a sliding scale approach to human conduct would more accurately
capture the moral complexity of the Evil Waiter Case and other fact
patterns that share a similar structure. It would, for example, make better
sense of so-called “double prevention” cases in which a person engages
in an affirmative act that prevents another from preventing a particular
harm.5 Like the Evil Waiter Case, double prevention cases share morally
relevant features of both acts and omissions and thus resist classification
as purely active or purely passive conduct. Furthermore, using Judith
Jarvis Thomson’s famous violinist example,6 I will argue that abortion
cases feature neither purely active nor entirely passive conduct. Rather,
abortion presents a case in which a failure to provide sustenance is
accomplished by way of an affirmative act. As such, abortion cases lie
somewhere along the sliding scale between fully affirmative and com-
pletely passive conduct.
Although replacing the act/omission distinction with a sliding scale
approach to human conduct would better describe the full import of con-
duct, such as the conduct presented in the Evil Waiter Case, double pre-
vention cases, and abortions, it would do so at great cost. Adoption of a
sliding scale of human conduct is ultimately unattractive because of the
ill-defined nature of the sliding scale inquiry would make it difficult for
the citizenry to know ex ante whether their conduct will be considered
an act, an omission, or something in between. This may unconstitution-
ally deprive defendants of fair warning.7 While this provides a decisive
argument against the criminal law’s adoption of a sliding scale approach
to human conduct, it does not foreclose the possibility of recognizing
actmissions as an autonomous category of human conduct alongside acts
and omissions. Doing so would better account for cases like the Evil
Waiter Case, double prevention cases, and abortions. Moreover, it would
do so without depriving defendants of fair warning. American criminal
law would thus be well served by replacing the rigid act/omission dis-
tinction with the richer act/omission/actmission tristinction.
5. An example of a “double prevention” case would be that of an actor that physically
restrains a person who is about to rescue a drowning child. By physically restraining the person,
the actor has prevented the person from preventing the death of a child. Double prevention cases
are discussed in more detail in Part III.A of this essay.
6. See Judith Jarvis Thomson, A Defense of Abortion, 1 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 47, 48–49 (1971).
7. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3 (“No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law shall be
passed.”); U.S. CONST. art. I, cl. 1 (“No State shall . . . pass any . . . ex post facto Law . . . .”).
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II. COMPETING FORMULATIONS: THE EVIL WAITER CASE AS ACTION,
OMISSION, AND ACTMISSION
A. The Evil Waiter Case as Action
Scholars and philosophers frequently define action as a “willed
bodily movement.”8 The few codes that define acts do so in similar fash-
ion. The Model Penal Code, for example, defines an act as a bodily
movement that is the “product of the effort or determination of the
actor.”9 According to this definition, the waiter in the Evil Waiter Case
engaged in an act that killed the hungry patron. After all, she engaged in
a willed bodily movement—placing the dish in front of the hungry
patron—that significantly contributed to the hungry patron’s death.10
There is much at stake in determining whether the waiter killed the
hungry patron by engaging in harm-causing action. Most theorists agree
that actions are more blameworthy than failures to act (omissions).11
This essay argues that actions are more blameworthy than omissions
because actions make the victim worse off than she was before. In con-
trast, omissions fail to make the victim better off.12 It seems quite evi-
dent that we have a stronger claim against others that they abstain from
making us worse off than we do to require them to make us better off.13
The difference between acts and omissions is not only of philo-
sophical significance. It is difficult to make sense of many important
features of our criminal laws without taking this distinction into account.
Homicide laws best illustrate this. Killing a human being without justifi-
cation or excuse is always punished quite severely.14 Nevertheless, let-
ting a human being die is not generally punished in the United States.15
There are, of course, exceptions to this rule. Letting a person die is pun-
ished as severely as killing a person if there is a special legal duty to
8. See, e.g., MICHAEL S. MOORE, ACT AND CRIME: THE PHILOSOPHY OF ACTION AND ITS
IMPLICATIONS FOR CRIMINAL LAW 78 (1993) (quoting Oliver Wendell Holmes who said an act
“‘is a willed muscular contraction, nothing more’”) (citation omitted).
9. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.01(2)(d) (1962).
10. This is what most civil law scholars conclude when they analyze this hypothetical. See,
e.g., EUGENIO RA ´UL ZAFFARONI ET AL., DERECHO PENAL: PARTE GENERAL 476 (Ediar 2d ed.
2002).
11. See, e.g., Warren S. Quinn, Actions, Intentions, and Consequences: The Doctrine of
Doing and Allowing, 98 PHIL. REV. 287, 298–300 (1989).
12. Some philosophers believe that omissions cannot cause harm. See, e.g., MOORE, supra
note 8, at 88 (theorizing that Oliver Wendell Holmes would say that “‘omissions aren’t acts, so R
the failure of our theory to include them as acts is not a defect but a virtue’”) (citation omitted).
Others, however, argue that omissions can be treated as causes of harms. See, e.g., H.L.A. HART
& A. M. HONOR ´E, CAUSATION IN THE LAW 35–36 (1959).
13. See, e.g., Quinn, supra note 11, at 289–90. R
14. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.2 (1962).
15. For a general overview of the failure of American jurisdictions to impose liability for
failure to rescue, see Dressler, supra note 3, at 975–77. R
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prevent that person’s death.16 Absent this special duty, however, letting
a person die is not punished at all in a majority of American jurisdic-
tions.17 The few jurisdictions that do punish such omissions punish them
much less severely than killing a person.18
It thus matters greatly whether the waiter in the Evil Waiter Case
killed the hungry patron or merely let him die.19 A superficial analysis
reveals that the waiter killed the patron because she engaged in a willed
bodily movement that contributed to the patron’s death. Upon closer
inspection, however, matters are more complicated. Did the waiter’s
conduct leave the hungry patron worse off than he was before, or did it
merely fail to make the patron better off? If it is the former, the waiter’s
conduct ought to be described as an act that deserves significant punish-
ment. If it is the latter, the waiter’s conduct is better described as an
omission that deserves significantly less punishment.
Unfortunately for the hungry patron, his fate was mostly deter-
mined when the chef unwittingly poured the poisoned mushroom sauce
on the filet mignon. Given the way in which restaurants typically oper-
ate, once a dish is ready to be taken to a given table, it is likely that the
dish will eventually find its way to its intended recipient. If the evil
waiter decided not to take the dish to the table, another waiter surely
would have. Consequently, it seems that the hungry patron cannot really
claim that the evil waiter’s conduct made him worse off, for he surely
would have died even had the evil waiter abstained from placing the dish
in front of him. This is not to say that the waiter’s conduct is not blame-
worthy. It surely is. However, her blameworthiness might be better
explained by her failure to do something once she became aware that the
mushroom sauce was poisoned. Note, however, that if the morally sali-
ent feature of the waiter’s conduct is her failure to say or do something
once she became aware of the danger, her conduct starts to look less like
an act and more like an omission.
16. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.01(3)(b) (1962).
17. See, e.g., Dressler, supra note 3, at 975 (“The general rule is that a person is not R
criminally responsible for what he fails to do.”).
18. This is the case, for example, in Vermont. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 519 (2013) (providing
for a duty to rescue, but willful violators are fined a maximum of $100).
19. Whether the course of conduct in the Evil Waiter Case is described as an act or an
omission matters greatly if it is assumed that acts are, ceteris paribus, more blameworthy than
omissions. If, however, omissions are as blameworthy as actions, then whether the evil waiter’s
conduct is described as active or omissive will not make a significant difference. In this essay, I
assume that acts are, ceteris paribus, more blameworthy than omissions and that, therefore, it
matters whether we describe the evil waiter’s conduct as an act or an omission. This is an
assumption shared by many philosophers. See Quinn, supra note 11, at 287–89. Furthermore, this R
assumption lies at the heart of how acts and omissions are approached in the law. As I discuss in
the text of this essay, all of the world’s legal systems punish acts more than omissions, unless the
failure to act is accompanied by a breach of a special duty to act.
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This is precisely what Gu¨nther Jakobs—the German scholar who
came up with this hypothetical—argues.20 For him, the waiter’s conduct
has the structure of an omission, for what is truly blameworthy about the
course of events is her failure to prevent harm to the patron while being
in a position to do so.21 Thus, according to Jakobs, the fact that the
waiter was performing a willed bodily movement at the time that the
failure to act took place is a morally irrelevant feature of the conduct.22
Describing the waiter’s conduct as an act is further cast into doubt
by comparing it with a variation of the Evil Waiter Case that I will call
the “Poisonous Waiter Case.”23 In this case, the mushroom sauce is not
poisoned when the waiter picks up the dish. However, the waiter poisons
the mushroom sauce before she takes the dish to the hungry patron. The
hungry patron eats the dish and dies several minutes later from food
poisoning.
The waiter in the Poisonous Waiter Case clearly kills the hungry
patron by engaging in an affirmative act, and there can be little doubt
that the hungry patron is made worse off by the waiter’s conduct. Note,
however, that the most salient feature of the Poisonous Waiter hypothet-
ical is not the waiter’s decision to take the dish to the hungry patron’s
table, but rather her decision to poison the mushrooms. This is not to
suggest that the act of placing the dish on the table is immaterial to
assessing the waiter’s blameworthiness in the Poisonous Waiter Case.
Perhaps this act further increases her blameworthiness. It can plausibly
be argued that the waiter who both poisons the dish and places it in front
of the patron is more blameworthy than the waiter who merely poisons
the dish but does not take it to the table. It would seem odd, however, to
suggest that a waiter who does not poison the dish but takes it to the
table knowing that it is poisoned is as blameworthy as a waiter who
actually poisons the dish. Once again, it appears that—while not incon-
sequential—the act of placing the dish in front of the hungry patron is
only a mildly relevant feature of the waiter’s conduct in both the Evil
Waiter Case and the Poisonous Waiter Case.
It is also useful to compare the Evil Waiter Case with the case of a
doctor who contributes to causing the death of a patient by flipping a
switch that discontinues life support.24 This case is interesting because—
20. JAKOBS, supra note 1, at 253. R
21. Id.
22. Id. Most European criminal law scholars reject Jakobs’ conclusion. See, e.g., ZAFFARONI
ET AL., supra note 10, at 476. R
23. Jakobs only discusses the Evil Waiter Case. Nevertheless, I devised the variations
discussed in this essay to help better identify the moral intuitions triggered by the Evil Waiter
Case.
24. In Actmissions, I argued in favor of describing termination of life support as an
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like in the Evil Waiter Case—a superficial analysis suggests that the
doctor engaged in an act that resulted in the death of the patient. After
all, flipping a switch is a clear-cut instance of a willed bodily movement.
However, a more careful analysis reveals that it is unclear whether the
doctor’s conduct is best described as an act. Perhaps it is better to
describe the doctor’s conduct as a failure to continue providing life sup-
port. Interestingly, most courts and scholars agree that this is the best
way of describing these life support cases.25 As a result, doctors are
generally allowed to discontinue life support if they obtain the consent
of the patient or the patient’s family.26 This can only be justified under
current law if flipping a switch that discontinues life support is viewed
as an omission.27 It would be unlawful to engage in such conduct if it
were described as action, for it would then amount to an unjustified act
of active euthanasia.28 In other words, the law currently allows doctors
to let their patients die if they obtain some form of consent, but it does
not allow them to kill their patients regardless of whether they obtain
consent to do so.29 When the doctor’s conduct is viewed as a failure to
continue treatment, the act of flipping the switch fades to the back-
ground. Similarly, the evil waiter’s act of bringing the plate to the table
becomes a morally immaterial feature of the conduct if we zero in on the
blameworthiness of failing to do something to prevent the hungry
patron’s death by food poisoning.
This analysis reveals that it is not at all obvious that the conduct of
the waiter in the Evil Waiter Case is best described as an action. While it
can be argued that the waiter killed the hungry patron by engaging in an
affirmative act, it can also plausibly be argued that the act that the waiter
performed—taking the dish to the table—only slightly explains the
extent of the waiter’s blameworthiness. In order to fully grasp the
waiter’s blameworthiness, it might be necessary to move beyond what
he did and focus on what he failed to do. The waiter’s act—like the
doctor’s flipping of the switch—is relevant only insofar as it is placed in
the broader context of what the waiter and doctor omitted. Their blame-
worthiness can only be fully assessed once their conduct is understood
not merely as “bringing the dish to the table” or “flipping the switch,”
“actmission” that is more blameworthy than refusing to provide medical treatment but less
blameworthy than actively assisting the patient in suicide. See Chiesa, supra note 4, at 585–87. R
25. See, e.g., Barber v. Superior Court, 147 Cal. App. 3d 1006, 1016 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983)
(“cessation of ‘heroic’ life support measures is not an affirmative act but rather a withdrawal or
omission”).
26. See, e.g., Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 285–88 (1990).
27. This is one of the lessons of the Barber case. See Barber, 147 Cal. App. 3d at 1017–18
(holding that there is no duty to continue life support “once it has proved to be ineffective”).
28. See, e.g., Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 732–34 (1997).
29. Id. at 724–26 (discussing Cruzan, 497 U.S. 261).
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but rather as “failing to do something to prevent the patron’s death” or
“failing to continue life support.” This sounds more like an omission and
less like an action.
B. The Evil Waiter Case as Omission
As the case of the doctor who discontinues life support demon-
strates, the fact that a willed bodily movement takes place is not deter-
minative of whether conduct ought to be described as an act or an
omission. Some willed bodily movements are simply irrelevant (or only
mildly material) to assessing the blameworthiness of the actor. We
would not, for example, describe the offense committed by an actor who
runs a red light by stepping on the gas as a crime of commission. Instead
of focusing on the willed bodily movement of stepping on the gas, we
should focus on the actor’s failure to stop his vehicle when he was
required to do so.30 As a result, the actor’s willed bodily movement
fades to the background, and we consider what he failed to do to be the
essence of his crime. In other words, his blameworthiness stems not
from what he did (stepping on the gas), but from what he did not do
(failing to stop at the red light). It is thus plausible to suggest that the
doctor’s blameworthiness stems not from his act of flipping a switch,
but rather from his failure to continue life support.31 Similarly, one may
argue that the waiter’s blameworthiness in the Evil Waiter Case is not
the product of her taking the dish to the table, but rather of her failure to
do something to prevent harm to the hungry patron.
1. THE STRUCTURE OF PASSIVE WRONGDOING—
THE OMISSIVE WAITER CASE
Unfortunately, describing the waiter’s conduct in the Evil Waiter
Case as an omission raises its own set of problems. Setting aside for the
moment the problem of ignoring that the waiter did engage in a willed
bodily movement that resulted in the death of the patron, there is some-
thing about the case that makes it intuitively different from straightfor-
ward instances of omissive wrongdoing. This can best be grasped by
comparing the Evil Waiter Case with a hypothetical that I will call the
30. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 316.0083(1)(a) (2014) (“A notice of violation and a traffic citation
may not be issued for failure to stop at a red light if the driver is making a right-hand turn in a
careful and prudent manner . . . .”) (emphasis added). Thus, omissions may be defined as the
failure to perform a bodily movement required by law rather than as a failure to act tout court.
31. I argue in Actmissions that viewing these cases as pure omissions is mistaken. Properly
understood, the conduct of discontinuing life support shares important features of both acts and
omissions. I thus describe this course of conduct as an “actmission.” See Chiesa, supra note 4, at R
583–87.
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“Omissive Waiter Case.”32 In this variation of the fact pattern, the waiter
who is taking the dish to the table is unaware that the mushroom sauce is
poisoned. When she is about to place the plate in front of the hungry
patron, the waiter working the table next to him—call him Waiter
Two—notices that the mushrooms used for the sauce are poisonous.
Like in the original hypothetical, Waiter Two is able to tell that the
mushrooms are poisoned only because of the special knowledge he has
acquired as a result of his advanced studies in science. Waiter Two has
enough time to say something that would prevent the dish from being
served to the hungry patron. Nevertheless, he says nothing. Conse-
quently, the dish is placed on the table, and the hungry patron eats it. He
dies several minutes later from mushroom poisoning.
It is obvious that the waiter in the Omissive Waiter Case is con-
nected to the harm suffered by the hungry patron only by his failure to
say or do something that would have prevented harm to the hungry
patron. Since the waiter in the Omissive Waiter Case did not poison the
mushroom sauce and was not carrying the poisoned dish to the table, he
would only be at fault for what happened if his failure to do something
to prevent harm to the patron is deemed worthy of condemnation. Most
would likely believe that his omission is, in fact, blameworthy as long as
he knew that the mushroom sauce was poisoned and he had sufficient
time to do something about it.33 The Omissive Waiter Case represents,
therefore, the paradigmatic case of blameworthy omissive conduct.
2. PROBING THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN PASSIVE AND ACTIVE
WRONGDOING—THE OMISSIVE WAITER AND POISONOUS
WAITER CASES COMPARED
In order to assess the blameworthiness inherent in the Omissive
Waiter Case, it is useful to compare it to the Poisonous Waiter Case,
where the waiter acted to poison the dish. It can thus be said that the
poisonous waiter killed the hungry patron. However, it cannot be argued
that the omissive waiter killed the hungry patron when he failed to tell
the patron or the person carrying the dish that the mushroom sauce was
poisoned. What can be said is that the waiter allowed the hungry patron
to die. While letting the patron die is surely worthy of blame, it is signif-
icantly less blameworthy than killing him. The difference between these
cases is such that the waiter in the Poisonous Waiter Case would likely
32. Although Jakobs came up with the original Evil Waiter Case, I came up with the
“Omissive Waiter” variation in order to highlight the differences between Jakobs’ original case
and a case of pure omission.
33. Curiously, the waiter’s conduct in the Omissive Waiter Case is likely not punishable in
the majority of American jurisdictions because mere failures to rescue do not generally give rise to
criminal liability in our country. See Dressler, supra note 3, at 975–77. R
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be sentenced to a term of imprisonment in excess of ten years in the vast
majority of American jurisdictions,34 whereas the waiter in the Omissive
Waiter Case would likely not be punished at all in most states.35
Another way of looking at these cases is by assessing whether the
victim was made worse off or merely not made better off by the conduct
of the waiters. In the Poisonous Waiter Case, the hungry patron was
clearly made worse off by the waiter’s act of poisoning the mushroom
sauce. The waiter in this case altered the expected course of events. The
dish that was served to the patron was not poisoned, and it was only
because the waiter poisoned the dish that the hungry patron ended up
dead. On the other hand, the waiter in the Omissive Waiter Case did not
make the patron worse off than he was before the failure to act took
place. Note that the dish destined for the hungry patron’s table was
already poisoned before the waiter took notice of the danger. Given that
the patron’s life was already in the “zone of danger,”36 the waiter’s
blame, if any, arises from his failure make the patron better off when he
decided to abstain from saying or doing something that would have
altered the expected course of events. In sum, the omission of the waiter
in the Omissive Waiter Case had the effect of letting events run their
course, whereas the act of the waiter in the Poisonous Waiter Case had
the effect of changing the course of events in a way that was detrimental
to the hungry patron’s well-being.
3. LESSONS FROM COMPARING THE EVIL WAITER CASE WITH THE
OMISSIVE AND POISONOUS WAITER CASES
Accurately assessing the blameworthiness of the waiter’s conduct
in the Evil Waiter Case requires that her failure to do or say something
to prevent harm to the patron be taken into account. This sounds in the
language of passive wrongdoing. Nevertheless, it seems wrong to sug-
gest that the waiter’s act of taking the dish to the table is immaterial to
gauging the extent of her blame. By personally placing the poisoned dish
in front of the patron, the waiter in the Evil Waiter Case seems to be
more entangled with the fate of the hungry patron than the waiter in the
Omissive Waiter Case who passively observes someone else take the
dish to the patron. As a result, the conduct of the waiter in the Evil
Waiter Case is not one of pure omission.37
It may be useful to look at this from the viewpoint of the hungry
34. See, e.g., U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2A1.1–.5 (2011) (outlining base
offense levels for crimes of homicide).
35. Dressler, supra note 3, at 975–77. R
36. Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad Co., 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928) (then-Judge Benjamin
Cardozo described the “zone of danger” when discussing proximate cause).
37. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.01(2)(d) (1962) (indicating that a bodily movement is not a
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patron and the claims he has against his servers. The patron’s strongest
claim would surely be against the waiter in the Poisonous Waiter Case.
The claim in that case would be “do not poison my food!” This is as
strong a claim as one can make. The patron’s claim against the waiter in
the Omissive Waiter Case would be significantly weaker. He could not,
of course, tell the waiter “do not poison me,” because the waiter simply
played no role in the causal processes that led to the food being
poisoned. Therefore, the patron could, at most, claim that the waiter
should “do something to stop me from eating the poisoned mushroom
sauce.”
Note that the patron’s claim in the Poisonous Waiter Case would
not meaningfully interfere with the waiter’s liberty. The waiter is not
being told what to do. Instead, she is being told that she can do anything
except the act that would significantly set back the patron’s well-being.
As a result, there are powerful reasons to allow the patron to make this
claim. In contrast, the claim in the Omissive Waiter Case would inter-
fere more significantly with the waiter’s liberty. In this instance, the
waiter is not merely being told that he has to abstain from doing some-
thing. He is being told that he must do something to advance the patron’s
welfare. This places a meaningful burden on the waiter’s freedom, for,
ceteris paribus, it is worse to be required to do something than to be told
that one cannot do something.38 Consequently, strong reasons militate
against giving the patron a right to make this claim in the Omissive
Waiter Case.
What kind of claim could the patron make in the Evil Waiter Case?
Would his claim be stronger or weaker than the claims in the Omissive
and Poisonous Waiter cases? The patron can coherently make two
claims in the Evil Waiter Case. First, he could legitimately say to the
waiter, “do not place the poisoned dish in front of me.” This is similar to
the claim in the Poisonous Waiter Case (“do not poison me”), for it
merely requires the waiter to abstain from doing something. Second, the
patron could claim that the waiter should “do or say something that
would stop me from eating the poisonous mushroom sauce.” This
sounds more like the claim in the Omissive Waiter Case (“do something
to stop me from being poisoned”), as it requires the waiter to do some-
thing that she was not planning to do.
There is another difference in the claims that can be made in the
Evil Waiter and Poisonous Waiter Cases. While the waiter in the Poison-
voluntary act if it “is not a product of the effort or determination of the actor”); see also MOORE,
supra note 8, at 78. R
38. See generally Quinn, supra note 11, at 289–98 (discussing the differences between R
“doing” and “allowing”).
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ous Waiter Case is merely being told to abstain from doing something
that he should not be doing in the first place (poisoning dishes), the
waiter in the Evil Waiter Case is being told that she should not do what
she signed up to do—serve dishes to the restaurant’s patrons. Telling a
person to do something different than what she signed up to do in order
to prevent harm to a third party may be more intrusive than to merely
require her to abstain from doing something that she should not be doing
to begin with.39
There is at least one more morally relevant difference in the Omis-
sive Waiter and Evil Waiter Cases. Requiring the waiter in the Omissive
Waiter Case to prevent the death of the hungry patron is particularly
intrusive because it would require him to come to the aid of someone he
was not assigned to serve.40 There is a sense in which requiring him to
do something to help a patron who is being served by a different waiter
would increase his responsibilities beyond what he presumably agreed to
do in the first place. Waiters are assigned to work certain tables, and
they could legitimately claim that they are not responsible for what hap-
pens to those at a table that has not been assigned to them. In contrast,
requiring the waiter in the Evil Waiter Case to abstain from taking the
dish to the hungry patron would require her to do something to prevent
harm to a person she was assigned to serve.41 The claim would be that
the waiter’s role of “serving” patrons also includes considering the well-
being of patrons. It could plausibly be argued, therefore, that the waiter
in the Evil Waiter Case has a special relationship with the hungry patron
that is simply absent in the Omissive Waiter Case. The waiter in the Evil
Waiter Case is responsible for the well-being of the patrons that she is
assigned to serve. As a result, it seems less intrusive to ask her to do
something to prevent harm to the hungry patron she is required to serve
than to ask a different waiter to do something to help a patron that she is
under no duty to aid.
4. PRELIMINARY CONCLUSION—THE EVIL WAITER’S CONDUCT IS
NOT PURELY OMISSIVE
There are several reasons to oppose describing the conduct in the
Evil Waiter Case as a mere omission. First, it seems intuitively wrong to
claim that the waiter in the Evil Waiter Case merely lets the hungry
patron die. Her act of taking the dish to the table and placing it in front
of the hungry patron links the patron’s fate to the conduct of the waiter
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in a much more direct manner than what is typical of cases of pure
omission. Second, in cases of true omissions—like the Omissive Waiter
Case—the victim’s claim is that the actor should do something to come
to his aid (e.g., say something that would prevent him from eating the
dish). This, however, does not accurately describe the claim in the Evil
Waiter Case. It is not merely a case of asking the waiter to come to the
aid of the patron. The patron in this case can also legitimately ask the
waiter to abstain from engaging in a course of conduct that would be
harmful to the patron (taking the dish to the table). This resembles the
sort of claims that victims have against actors in cases of active wrong-
doing such as the Poisonous Waiter Case (“do not poison the dish!”).
Finally, the victim in cases of pure omission generally asks the actor to
do something that goes above and beyond what the actor is expected to
do.42 This is why such omissions are typically not punished in American
jurisdictions. While it is obviously legitimate to ask people to abstain
from causing harm to others, it is not altogether clear that it is appropri-
ate to ask people to heroically come to the aid of others.43 Once again,
the Omissive Waiter Case is illustrative. The waiter in that case is at
fault for not coming to the aid of someone he was not expected to help
or serve. Since he was assigned to a different table, the omissive waiter
was not ultimately responsible for the hungry patron’s well-being. The
waiter in the Evil Waiter Case is in a different position. She is being
faulted for failing to prevent harm to a person she was expected to serve.
As a result, requiring her to do something to prevent harm to the patron
is less intrusive than requiring an uninvolved third party to come to the
aid of the patron.
C. The Evil Waiter Case as Commission by Omission
The law singles out a special group of harm-causing omissions that
may give rise to liability as if the actor had caused the harm by way of
an affirmative act. Following George Fletcher’s terminology, I will call
these cases instances of “commission by omission,”44 given that the
actor in these cases can be held liable for a crime of commission
although the harm has been brought about by an omission. In order for
an actor to be held liable for a crime of commission by omission, his
conduct must meet three criteria. First, he must fail to perform an act.45
Second, his failure to act must be the physical and proximate cause of a
42. This is not the case if there is a special duty to act. See infra Part II.C.
43. See, e.g., Quinn, supra note 11, at 307–08. R
44. These cases are typically referred to as cases of “commission by omission” in continental
jurisdictions. See, e.g., GEORGE P. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW 612 (1978).
45. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.01(3)(a)–(b) (1962) (discussing the requirements of
performing a voluntary act).
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harm suffered by the victim.46 Third, he must have a special duty to act
that links him to the victim in a particular way.47 The paradigmatic
example of a crime of commission by omission is that of a parent who
causes the death of her child by failing to provide the child with ade-
quate medical care.48 In such cases, the parent fails to perform an act
(providing her child with adequate medical care), the child dies as a
result of the failure of the parent to provide medical care (causation
requirement), and the parent has a special duty to care for her child that
links her to the child’s well-being in a very stringent and particular way
(special duty requirement). As a result, the parent’s omission gives rise
to liability for homicide as if she had killed her child by way of an
affirmative act.49
Perhaps the waiter’s conduct in the Evil Waiter Case is best
described as an instance of commission by omission. As was pointed out
in the previous section, the conduct of the evil waiter can plausibly be
described as failing to do something to prevent harm to the patron.50
Furthermore, the waiter’s failure to act may be causally linked to the
death of the patron in at least two ways. First, had the waiter done some-
thing to let the patron know that the dish was poisoned, the patron likely
would not have died. Therefore, the waiter’s conduct may be considered
the physical or the “but for” cause of the patron’s death. Second, the
death of the patron was a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the
waiter’s failure to tell the patron that the dish was poisoned. Conse-
quently, the waiter’s conduct may also be considered the proximate
cause of the patron’s death. Additionally, the waiter arguably had a spe-
cial duty to act in furtherance of the well-being of the patron he was
assigned to serve.
Viewing the Evil Waiter Case as an instance of commission by
omission can adequately account for some of the differences between
this case and the Omissive Waiter Case. It is more plausible to argue that
the waiter in the Evil Waiter Case has a special duty to act in furtherance
of the well-being of the patron than it is to contend that the waiter in the
Omissive Waiter Case had a special duty to prevent harm to the patron.
As the previous section points out, the waiter in the Evil Waiter Case
was assigned to serve the hungry patron’s table, whereas the waiter in
46. See id. § 2.03(1)(a) (“Conduct is the cause of a result when . . . it is an antecedent but for
which the result in question would not have occurred . . . .”).
47. See id. § 2.01(3)(b) (“Liability . . . may not be based on an omission unaccompanied by
action unless . . . a duty to perform the omitted act is otherwise imposed by law.”).
48. See, e.g., People v. Steinberg, 595 N.E.2d 845, 846–47 (1992) (parent who failed to
provide child with medical care was held liable for homicide by omission).
49. See id. at 847.
50. See infra Part II.B.3.
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the Omissive Waiter Case was not assigned to that table.51 As a result, it
is sensible to conclude that the waiter in the Evil Waiter Case is more
closely linked to the hungry patron than the waiter in the Omissive
Waiter Case. This could explain the different blameworthiness of the
waiters in these two cases. The waiter in the Evil Waiter Case is more
blameworthy than the waiter in the Omissive Waiter Case because the
waiter’s conduct in the former case breaches a special duty to act that is
simply non-existent in the latter case.
Treating the Evil Waiter Case as one in which the death of the
hungry patron is the product of commission by omission would lead to
punishing the waiter in this case as severely as if he had killed the patron
by way of an affirmative act.52 That is, it would lead to punishing the
waiter in the Evil Waiter Case as much as the waiter who poisons the
dish and then takes it to the hungry patron (the Poisonous Waiter Case).
This approach does not calibrate the relative blameworthiness of the
waiters in the different cases.
To understand why it does not seem right to punish the waiter in
the Evil Waiter Case as severely as the waiter in the Poisonous Waiter
Case, it is necessary to explain why it is usually the case that instances
of commission by omission should be punished as harshly as cases of
causing harm by way of an affirmative act.53 As a general rule, actors
who engage in harm-producing acts are more blameworthy than actors
who produce harm by failing to act.54 Why, then, do we sometimes pun-
ish harm-causing omissions as severely as harm-producing acts? Why
do we punish the mother who causes the death of her child by failing to
provide her with adequate medical care as severely as the mother who
kills her child by poisoning her food?55
The key to unlocking this puzzle is the additional blameworthiness
that attaches for breaching the special duty to act that triggers liability
for a crime of commission by omission. The actor’s blame in cases of
commission by omission is dependent on two factors. First, the actor is
blameworthy for failing to prevent harm to the victim. This, however, is
not enough to justify punishing the actor’s failure to act as severely as if
he had inflicted the harm by engaging in an act. In addition to this, the
actor in cases of commission by omission is blameworthy for having
breached a duty to act that made him responsible in a special kind of
51. See infra Part II.B.3.
52. See, for example, § 2.01(3)(b), which equates harm-causing omissions that breach a
special legal duty to act with harm-causing actions.
53. See Dressler, supra note 3, at 975–77. R
54. Id. at 975.
55. The law does not generally distinguish between different ways of killing, so it is irrelevant
that the child dies as a result of food poisoning or of a failure to receive medical attention.
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way for the victim’s well-being. It is because of the combination of
these two factors, failure to prevent harm and breach of a special duty to
act, that the actor in cases of commission by omission is punished as
severely as the actor who causes harm by performing an affirmative
act.56
An often-ignored problem inherent in cases of commission by
omission is determining which duties give rise to liability for a crime of
commission by omission. It is tempting to conclude that the breach of
any duty to act might give rise to liability for a crime of commission by
omission. A closer look reveals that this cannot be the case. For exam-
ple, take an ordinance that imposes on property owners the duty to
remove snow from the sidewalks directly in front of their property.57 Is a
property owner who fails to remove snow from the sidewalk liable for
homicide if a person slips and falls on the slippery sidewalk and dies as
a result of the fall? While a breach of this duty may give rise to tort
liability for any injuries suffered by those who are injured as a result of
the failure to remove snow,58 it is unclear whether the breach could also
give rise to criminal liability. There are other examples. Police officers
obviously have a duty to prevent crime. But is a police officer who wit-
nesses an assault and does not prevent it liable solely for failing to prop-
erly discharge his duties, a crime of pure omission, or is he also liable
for complicity in the assault?59 Once again, it is not clear that the latter is
the right answer. A school janitor has a duty to remove a banana peel
from the school hallway. He sees the banana peel but fails to remove it
because he is busy reading the paper. A student slips and falls, hitting
her head on the floor and dying as a result. Is the janitor liable for negli-
gent homicide? Again, the answer is unclear.60
56. The following table illustrates why and when I believe we are justified in punishing harm-
causing omissions as severely as harm-inflicting actions:
Conduct Blameworthiness Total Blame
Killing (act) 100 100
Letting a Person Die (omission) 50 50
Breaching a Special Duty (i.e. parent’s failure to provide child 50 50
with medical care)
Letting a Person Die Who You Have a Special Duty to Protect 50+50 100(commission by omission)
57. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 67.9 (West 2014).
58. But see Gillen v. Martini, 188 N.W.2d 43, 44 (Mich. Ct. App. 1971) (“[A]n abutting
property owner may not be held liable to pedestrians for injuries sustained by falling on sidewalks
made hazardous by natural accumulations of ice and snow, and statutes and ordinances which
impose a duty upon landowners to clean sidewalks create no private liability.”).
59. See, e.g., Pueblo v. Sustache Sustache, 2009 TSPR 119 (P.R. 2009).
60. Depending on the precise facts at hand, the janitor’s employer may be subject to civil
liability for the janitor’s failure to act. See, e.g., Moore v. Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc., 173 So. 2d 603,
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The correct solution to these cases is unclear because not every
breach of a duty necessarily gives rise to liability for a crime of commis-
sion by omission. Commission by omission liability usually attaches
when the actor had a special duty to protect a particular person or group
of persons from harm or if the actor engaged in an affirmative act that
created the peril that eventually harmed the victim.61 I will call the for-
mer type of obligations “duties to protect,” whereas I will call the latter
obligations “duties that arise due to risk creation.” The duty to protect is
special because it applies only when the actor has an obligation to look
out for the well-being of a particular individual or group of individu-
als.62 It does not apply when the obligation that is imposed is for the
well-being of the general citizenry.63 Therefore, the few “duty to rescue”
statutes that have been enacted in America do not create special duties
that may trigger liability for a crime of commission by omission. The
duty that is imposed by such statutes is a general duty to aid that does
not focus on a particular individual or a particular group of people.64
Obvious examples of duties to protect are the duties that parents have
toward their children,65 spouses have toward each other,66 lifeguards
have toward swimmers,67 and bodyguards have toward the person they
are contracted to protect. The paradigmatic example of a duty that arises
due to risk creation is that of the driver who hits another car.68 In such
608 (Miss. 1965) (holding that where a janitor did not remove a banana peel from the floor, a
reasonable jury could find the janitor’s employer to be liable to a plaintiff who was injured when
slipping on that banana peel). But, again, it is not clear whether criminal liability could arise from
such an event.
61. Fletcher, supra note 44, at 611–24. R
62. See, e.g., Peter Lopez, Comment, Foreseeable Zone of Risk: An Analysis of Florida’s Off-
Premises Liability Standard, 55 U. MIAMI L. REV. 397, 404 (2001) (discussing when a landowner
may have to duty to protect invitees even at points in time when those invitees are not on the
landowner’s property).
63. See, e.g., id. at 413 n.118 (citing Ferreira v. Strack, 636 A.2d 682, 686 (R.I. 1994))
(“[T]here [is] no duty to protect an individual from injury by a third party on land which is not
owned, possessed or controlled by the landowner.”).
64. This, of course, is the right solution, given that duty to rescue statutes are intended to
impose liability in cases in which imposing commission by omission liability would be improper.
65. See, e.g., People v. Steinberg, 595 N.E.2d 845, 846–47 (1992).
66. This is perhaps a moral duty more so than it is a legal duty. See, e.g., Guevara v. State,
191 S.W.3d 203, 207 (Tex. App. 2005) (“[A]lthough spouses and family members may have a
moral duty to exercise care toward one another, it does not follow that a legal duty to prevent
harm necessarily arises from the familial relationship.” (emphasis added)).
67. See, e.g., Gonzales v. City of San Diego, 182 Cal. Rptr. 73, 76 (Cal. Ct. App. 1982)
(holding that when a city voluntarily provides lifeguards, it voluntarily assumes a protective duty
toward members of the public, and the city could then be held liable for negligent acts committed
by its lifeguards).
68. Note that the creation of the risk must be the product of an act. The duty does not arise if
the risk is created by “omission,” for there would be nothing in those cases to distinguish the
omission that causes harm from the omission that causes risk. They would be one and the same.
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cases, the driver must stop and help the occupants of the vehicle he hit.69
Failure to do so would lead to liability for the injuries suffered by the
occupants.70
The above mentioned cases involving snow removal ordinances,
police officers who fail to prevent crime, and careless janitors who do
not keep the premises clean are problematic because, although the actors
certainly breached a duty to act, it seems that the duty that they breached
is not of the kind that typically gives rise to commission by omission
liability. More specifically, in the case of snow removal statutes, prop-
erty owners do not engage in an affirmative act that creates a risk of
harm; rather, the risk of someone slipping on accumulated ice and snow
is created by an omission to shovel the sidewalk.71 Furthermore, the
property owner does not have a duty to protect a particular person or
group of persons. Rather, the ordinance imposes a duty to protect the
general citizenry.72 As such, it seems closer to the general duty to rescue
statutes than to the laws that impose duties that give rise to liability for
commission by omission. Similarly, police officers have a general duty
to help the population at large, but they do not typically assume duties to
aid a particular individual or group of persons.73 Of course, there are
some circumstances in which a police officer may assume the duty to
protect a particular individual or group of individuals. The breach of this
kind of duty may give rise to liability for a crime of commission by
omission. Finally, although the school janitor may have a duty to keep
the premises clean, he certainly does not have a duty to protect the stu-
dents from physical harm. Furthermore, it seems that the janitor owes a
duty to his employer, the school administration, instead of directly to the
students. Therefore, it would be odd if the breach of his duty to keep the
school premises clean could be enough to trigger liability for a crime of
commission by omission.
Discussion of these cases highlights the problems inherent in
69. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 316.027(2)(a) (2014) (“The driver of a vehicle involved in a crash
occurring on public or private property which results in injury to a person other than serious
bodily injury shall immediately stop the vehicle at the scene of the crash, or as close thereto as
possible, and shall remain at the scene of the crash . . . .”).
70. State v. Mancuso, 652 So. 2d 370, 371 (Fla. 1995) (holding that leaving the scene of an
accident when the defendant should have known an injury occurred results in criminal liability).
71. See Gillen v. Martini, 188 N.W.2d 43, 44 (Mich. Ct. App. 1971) (finding no liability
when the hazard created is due to the natural accumulation of ice and snow, but noting that a
landowner that creates an artificial hazard on the sidewalk may be subject to liability).
72. See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 67.9 (West 2014).
73.  Michael Pawlik, El Funcionario Policial Como Garante de Impedir Delitos, INDRET:
REVISTA PARA EL AN ´ALISIS DEL DERECHO, Jan. 2008, at 3–5, available at http://www.raco.cat/
index.php/InDret/article/viewFile/77888/101743 (concluding that the failure of a policeman in his
duty is the same as commission of that crime because the State, as an “institution,” has a duty to
protect its citizens).
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describing the Evil Waiter Case as an instance of commission by omis-
sion. First, it is unclear whether the waiter in this case owes a duty to the
patrons of the establishment. Perhaps it is best to assume that waiters—
like school janitors—owe a duty to their employer (in this case, the res-
taurant). The waiter-patron connection is thus indirect. The waiter owes
a duty to the restaurant, which, in turn, owes a duty to the patrons. Sec-
ond, even if it is assumed that the waiter owes a duty directly to the
patron, it is doubtful that the duty owed to the patron is a duty to rescue.
If any, the duty owed by a waiter to a patron is to wait tables, but not to
guarantee the patron’s physical well-being.
The waiter-patron relationship is thus markedly different than the
parent-child relationship. While parents have a duty to come to their
child’s aid if the need arises,74 waiters have no such duty toward their
patrons. A waiter is not, for example, required to perform the Heimlich
maneuver on a patron who chokes on his food. It would, of course, be
morally blameworthy for the waiter not to do something if his patron
were choking, but it would not give rise to criminal liability. Even if it
would give rise to some liability, it would certainly not give rise to com-
mission by omission liability for homicide. The reason is intuitively
obvious, even if not easily explained. Waiters who fail to come to the
rescue of restaurant patrons are simply not as morally blameworthy as
parents who fail to come to the rescue of their children or as lifeguards
who fail to come to the rescue of drowning swimmers.
I previously suggested that a significant difference between the Evil
Waiter Case and the Omissive Waiter Case is that the waiter in the for-
mer case has a more stringent duty toward the hungry patron than the
waiter in the latter case. This assumes that the waiter in the Evil Waiter
Case was assigned to wait the hungry patron’s table, whereas the waiter
in the Omissive Waiter Case was not assigned to that table. This may
have some bearing on the duties imposed on the two waiters. From the
patron’s point of view, he obviously will think that he can require more
of the waiter assigned to his table than of other waiters. Nevertheless, as
the cases discussed in this section reveal, waiters do not appear to have a
duty to come to the aid of patrons. This holds regardless of whether the
waiter is assigned to serve a particular table or not. Their duty simply
does not extend to guaranteeing the patron’s physical well-being. There-
fore, whatever duty the waiters owe to the patron in these cases is not
stringent enough to justify imposing liability for homicide on the basis
of commission by omission.
Now consider a final variation of the Evil Waiter Case. Assume
that the waiter assigned to the hungry patron’s table is busy taking food
74. See, e.g., People v. Steinberg, 595 N.E.2d 845, 846–47 (1992).
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to another table. In the interim, a different waiter decides to take the dish
to the hungry patron. Although the waiter knows that he is not assigned
to the hungry patron’s table, he figures he might as well lend a helping
hand to his fellow waiter who is supremely busy at the time. While this
is happening, the waiter assigned to the hungry patron’s table notices
that the dish is being placed in front of the hungry patron. He also
notices that the dish is poisoned. The waiter assigned to serve the hungry
patron does nothing, and the hungry patron dies. Is the waiter assigned
to serve the hungry patron liable for homicide? Once again, it seems that
he is not. The fact that he was assigned to serve the hungry patron does
not appear to make a difference, for what is ultimately determinative is
the scope of the duty owed by the waiter to the patron. And it just seems
that waiters do not have a duty to rescue patrons who are in need of
help.75 Therefore, there are good reasons to resist describing the Evil
Waiter Case (and the rest of the evil waiter cases) as instances of com-
mission by omission.
D. The Evil Waiter Case as Actmission
1. THE EVIL WAITER CASE DOES NOT PRESENT PURELY ACTIVE
OR PASSIVE CONDUCT
The Evil Waiter Case is problematic. It is tempting to describe the
conduct of the evil waiter as an action. After all, she takes the dish and
places it in front of the hungry patron. This nominally satisfies the defi-
nition of an action, for it amounts to a willed bodily movement.76 It is
unclear, however, whether the act of taking the dish to the table is a
legally and morally relevant feature of the conduct. It can be argued that
what is truly blameworthy in this case is not the act of taking the dish to
the table, but rather the waiter’s failure to say or do something that
would prevent the patron from eating the dish. If so, the waiter’s conduct
is better described as an omission. Her blame would then be the failure
to do something that would have prevented the patron’s death.
Describing the waiter’s conduct in the Evil Waiter Case as an omis-
sion is also problematic. Wrongful omissions are less blameworthy than
wrongful acts because omissions fail to make the victim better off,
whereas actions make the victim worse off. The problem is that the
waiter’s conduct in the Evil Waiter Case does not merely fail to make
75. Cf. Boller v. Robert W. Woodruff Arts Ctr., Inc., 716 S.E.2d 713, 716 (Ga. Ct. App.
2011) (holding that the venue owner did not have a duty to provide medical care to a concert
patron who suffered a heart attack because the venue owner did not cause the plaintiff’s heart
attack); Rasnick v. Krishna Hospitality, Inc., 690 S.E.2d 670, 673–75 (Ga. Ct. App. 2010)
(holding that an innkeeper had no duty to rescue a guest suffering from a severe medical
condition).
76. See supra note 37. R
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the patron better off. To be sure, the patron would have been better off
had the waiter done something to prevent him from eating the dish.
However, it may also be argued that the patron was made worse off by
the waiter’s decision to place the dish in front of him. The waiter’s
willed bodily movement is not wholly immaterial to assessing her
blameworthiness for the patron’s death.
2. THE EVIL WAITER’S CONDUCT AS AN “ACTMISSION” THAT IS
BOTH ACTIVE AND PASSIVE IN MORALLY RELEVANT WAYS
A fresh start is clearly needed. If it is inappropriate to regard the
Evil Waiter Case as an instance of action, and it is also problematic to
consider it a case of omission, how should we proceed? It is submitted
that the reason why assessing the waiter’s blameworthiness in the Evil
Waiter Case is difficult is because the waiter’s conduct shares important
features of both acts and omissions. On the one hand, the waiter engages
in a willed bodily movement that is causally linked to the harm that is
eventually suffered by the hungry patron. Taking the dish to the table
and placing it in front of the table is clearly an act. And this act is not
entirely devoid of moral relevance. Nevertheless, merely describing the
evil waiter’s conduct as action does not fully explain her blameworthi-
ness. Her blameworthiness is also affected by her knowledge that the
dish was poisoned and her failure to do something about it. This sounds
in the language of omission. The full scope of the waiter’s blameworthi-
ness cannot be assessed until this failure to act is factored in.77
As a result, a complete account of the evil waiter’s blameworthi-
ness requires making reference to both the act of placing the dish in
front of the hungry patron and the waiter’s omission in failing to say or
do something to prevent the hungry patron from eating the poisoned
mushroom sauce. The waiter’s conduct is, in other words, both active
and passive. Nevertheless, it is neither purely an act nor purely an omis-
sion. It is, for lack of a better word, an actmission.
Two practical consequences follow from labeling the waiter’s con-
duct an actmission. First, the waiter’s conduct should be viewed as more
blameworthy than purely omissive conduct. Second, the waiter’s con-
duct should be considered less blameworthy than purely active con-
duct.78 In terms of criminal liability and punishment, the waiter should
be punished more severely than someone who merely lets the victim die
77. See Chiesa, supra note 4, at 614 (“[T]he act/omission distinction is morally relevant
because it is generally worse to engage in conduct that makes someone worse off than to engage
in conduct that merely fails to make someone better off.”).
78. See id. at 596 (discussing the blameworthiness of a doctor who discontinues life support
in the context of actmissions).
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by pure omission. She should, however, be punished less severely than
someone who actively kills the victim by pure action.
Distinguishing between acts, omissions, and actmissions allows us
to make better sense of the differences between the Evil Waiter Case and
the Poisonous Waiter and Omissive Waiter cases. Most people find it
intuitively obvious that the waiter in the Poisonous Waiter Case is more
worthy of blame than the waiters in the Evil Waiter and Omissive
Waiter cases.79 The waiter who poisons the mushroom sauce is more
deserving of blame than the one who becomes aware that the mushroom
sauce is poisoned and nevertheless takes the dish to the hungry patron’s
table. The waiter who poisons the dish is also obviously more blame-
worthy than the waiter who merely lets another waiter take the poisoned
dish to the patron’s table. Most people also seem to believe that the
waiter who is least deserving of blame is the one in the Omissive Waiter
Case.80 Witnessing another person take a poisoned dish to the patron’s
table and not doing anything seems intuitively less blameworthy than
personally poisoning the dish. It also seems less blameworthy than not
poisoning the dish but personally taking it to the table. Not surprisingly,
it is more difficult to make sense of the Evil Waiter Case. Intuitions
suggest that this case is more blameworthy than merely witnessing
someone else place the dish in front of the patron (like the omissive
waiter), but less blameworthy than poisoning the dish (like the poison-
ous waiter).
Intuitions may suggest that actmissions are more blameworthy than
omissions but less blameworthy than actions—and those intuitions are
probably justified. As was previously explained, acts are blameworthy
because they make the victim worse off than she was before. In the
Poisonous Waiter Case, for example, poisoning the dish made the pros-
pects of the hungry patron worse off. In contrast, the waiter in the Omis-
sive Waiter Case is blameworthy because he failed to make the patron
better off when he did not come to his aid. But actmissions are blame-
worthy because—like omissions—they fail to make the victim better off
and—like actions—they make the victim worse off. Actmissions do
both.
Actmissions, like actions, leave the victim worse off than he was
prior to the relevant harm-causing willed bodily movement.81 The patron
is worse off when the waiter places the dish in front of him than when
79. I have discussed these three cases with numerous people. Some were law professors,
others were school staff members, others were friends of diverse backgrounds. The vast majority
believe that the most blameworthy conduct is that of poisoning the dish and taking it to the patron.
80. This conclusion is also nearly unanimous amongst those that I have informally surveyed.
81. See Chiesa, supra note 4, at 596 (arguing that actmissions are like actions in that they
create a new risk “that did not exist immediately prior to the relevant harm causing willed bodily
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the dish was lying on the kitchen counter. Nevertheless, there is a sense
in which actmissions do not make the victim worse off, for they do not
set in motion the course of events that is likely to cause harm to the
victim.82 “This is what makes actmissions different from [pure] actions.
Actions set in motion a course of events that will likely result in harm to
the victim.”83  Actmissions, in contrast, merely let harm-causing events
run their course.
This raises a further question. If actmissions—like omissions—do
not create the risk that leads to harming the victim, what makes them
more blameworthy than failures to act?84 Actmissions are different
because—unlike omissions—they accelerate the culmination of a harm-
ful course of events that was already in motion when the actmission took
place. This is what happens in the Evil Waiter Case. The patron was
likely going to die of food poisoning regardless of the evil waiter’s con-
duct. Had the evil waiter not placed the dish in front of the hungry
patron, a different waiter would have probably done so. Since the course
of events that was meant to harm the victim—poisoning the dish and
placing it where a waiter would pick it up—was already set in motion
prior to the evil waiter’s conduct, there is a sense that what the waiter
does is merely allow the events to unfold. However, the waiter’s actmis-
sion does something more than merely let events run their course. It
accelerates the occurrence of the harm that was likely to take place any-
way. And this is more blameworthy than merely letting the harm happen
in due course.85
This is the special kind of harm that is brought about by the evil
waiter’s actmission. Given that the evil waiter’s actmission (taking the
dish to the table) hastened the occurrence of harm to the patron, she
movement. . . . Nevertheless, actmissions . . . do not create a risk that is different from the risk that
jeopardized the victim’s wellbeing in the first place”).
82. See id. (For example, “discontinuing life support merely subjects the victim to the same
risk that she was subjected to prior to receiving medical treatment.” That is to say, “the patient’s
life is jeopardized by h[er] ailment, not by the withholding of further treatment.”).
83. Id.
84. I have asked, and answered, this very question in my past work, Actmissions. See id. at
597.
85. In Actmissions, I also argued that some actmissions are blameworthy because they hasten
the occurrence of harm that would likely materialize anyway, while other actmissions are
blameworthy because they return the victim to a zone of danger that she was previously shielded
against. Id. This is what happens when a doctor discontinues life support. By discontinuing life
support, the doctor is returning the victim to a condition in which her life will once again be in
jeopardy. Moreover, the doctor is returning the victim to the same dangerous condition that she
was in before the decision to begin life support was made. This kind of actmission presents a
course of conduct that can thus be described as an abandoned rescue. The victim is temporarily
safer because she is protected by the actor, who then decides to do something that results in an
abandoned rescue. In so doing, the actor once again places the victim at risk of suffering the kind
of harm that it seemed the actor was protecting her against. Id.
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should be punished more than the actor in the Omissive Waiter Case
who merely allowed the patron to be harmed. In contrast, since the evil
waiter’s actmission did not set in motion the course of events that was
likely to harm the patron, she should be punished less than the waiter in
the Poisonous Waiter Case who was responsible for creating the risk of
harm to the victim.
The following table summarizes the defining features of actmis-
sions and explains why the Evil Waiter Case displays the signature
structure of what I call an “actmission”:
TABLE 1: ACTMISSIONS86
Requirement Comments Illustration
1. “[A] harm causing event must Actor does not create The dish is poisoned
be set in motion by someone or danger that threatens before the waiter
something other than the actor.” the victim touches it
2. “[T]he actor must find himself Triggering condition Waiter can prevent
in a position in which he can do for duty to rescue harm to patron by not
something to prevent the event placing dish in front of
from transpiring and causing harm him
to the victim.”
3. “[T]he actor fails to do Failure to rescue Waiter fails to save
something to prevent harm to the patron when he places
actor.” dish in front of him
(similar to omission)
4. “[T]he actor’s failure to do Action that fails to Placing dish in front of
something to prevent harm to the make victim better off patron is willed bodily
actor must consist of a willed rather than making movement (similar to
bodily movement.” victim worse off action)
5. “[T]he willed bodily movement Distinct actmissions Placing dish in front of
either accelerates the occurrence of harm that is less patron accelerates
a harm that would have likely wrongful than harmful occurrence of patron’s
taken place anyway or returns the actions but more likely death
victim to a zone of danger that the wrongful than harmful (actmission)
actor had shielded her against.” omissions
III. LESSONS FROM THE EVIL WAITER CASE: THE ACT/OMISSION
DISTINCTION IS IN NEED OF AN OVERHAUL
A. Should the Act/Omission Distinction be Replaced with a Sliding
Scale of Human Conduct?
An analysis of the Evil Waiter Case reveals that there are some
courses of conduct that share morally relevant features of both acts and
omissions. Is the Evil Waiter Case simply an anomaly, or does it reveal
86.  Table 1 is meant as an illustrative tool and was created by the author using his past work,
Actmissions. See id. at 598.
\\jciprod01\productn\M\MIA\69-1\MIA109.txt unknown Seq: 26 25-NOV-14 8:45
186 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 69:161
a more pervasive problem that criminal law ought to address? I believe it
is the latter. The existence of actmissions forces us to seriously consider
whether the act/omission distinction should be replaced with a sliding
scale that admits a myriad of different courses of conduct that lie some-
where between pure actions and pure omissions.
American criminal law currently approaches human conduct in an
all-or-nothing fashion. Harm that is relevant to the criminal law (e.g., the
death of a person) can either be produced by an action (stabbing a per-
son) or an omission (failing to rescue a drowning person). If harm is
caused by action, the defendant is liable regardless of whether he owed a
special duty to the victim.87 The presence of harm-causing action thus
obviates the duty inquiry. In contrast, if harm is brought about by omis-
sion, there is liability only if the defendant owed the victim a special
duty to act.88 Omissions thus raise duty inquiries that are non-existent
when harm is caused actively. Acts and omissions function in an all-or-
nothing fashion because harm is either brought about actively or pas-
sively and, together, these two possibilities exhaust the forms of com-
mission of criminal offenses.89
The existence of “actmissions” that share morally relevant features
of both acts and omissions calls into question the all-or-nothing nature
of the act/omission distinction. If there are courses of conduct that are
neither active nor omissive, then the act/omission distinction fails to
exhaust the different ways of committing criminal offenses. Acknowl-
edging the existence of courses of action that lie somewhere between
active and passive conduct opens the door to arguing that the rigid act/
omission dichotomy ought to be replaced with a sliding scale of conduct
that goes from fully passive to fully active. According to this approach,
the decision maker should not be forced to decide whether conduct is
only either an act or an omission. Rather, the adjudicator should take
into account a series of factors that give her discretion to decide where
the conduct falls between the two extremes of fully active and fully pas-
sive conduct. The factors that the decision maker could take into account
87. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.01(1) (1962).
88. See, e.g., id. § 2.01(3)(b).
89. See, e.g., id § 2.01(1) (no offense can be committed unless it “is based on conduct that
includes a voluntary act or the omission to perform an act”). In a sense, the norms that the
criminal law currently adopts to classify human conduct function like “rules.” A rule is a norm
that applies in an all-or-nothing fashion. See generally Ronald M. Dworkin, The Model of Rules,
35 U. CHI. L. REV. 14, 25 (1967). When a rule applies, it is outcome determinative. Id. The
criminal law’s norms relating to human conduct function mostly like rules because conduct has to
be classified as either an act or an omission, and whether the conduct is described as one or the
other will typically be dispositive of whether the prosecution needs to show that the defendant had
a legal duty to act. As a result, describing conduct as an act or omission is quite frequently
outcome determinative.
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might include whether the actor performed a willed bodily movement,
whether the conduct created a new risk of harm or merely allowed an
already existing risk to materialize, whether the conduct accelerated the
occurrence of a harm that would likely take place anyway, and the
strength of the causal connection between the actor’s conduct and the
victim’s harm. After balancing these factors, the judge would have the
discretion to determine where the conduct falls in the sliding scale of
active and passive wrongdoing.90
This sliding scale approach better captures the complexity of our
moral universe. Take, for example, instances of conduct that the philoso-
pher Michael Moore has called “double preventions.”91 Double preven-
tions consist of courses of conduct in which a person engages in an act
that prevents someone else from preventing harm to another person.92
Suppose that Juan uses physical force to restrain Marı´a, who was about
to save a drowning child.93 No one saves the drowning child and the
child dies. In this case, Juan engages in an act (physically restraining
Marı´a) that prevented Marı´a from preventing the death of the drowning
child. Did Juan kill the drowning child or did he merely let the child die?
On the one hand, Juan engaged in a willed bodily movement (restraining
Marı´a) that is relevant to explaining why the child drowned. This sounds
in the language of action and, therefore, supports a finding that Juan
“killed” the child. On the other hand, Juan’s act merely allowed the child
to drown. This sounds like an omission and, consequently, counsels in
favor of concluding that Juan merely let the child die.
I submit that most people’s intuitions are that producing harm by a
double prevention is less blameworthy than actively causing it, but is
more worthy of condemnation than passively letting it happen. That is,
Juan is more deserving of blame for preventing Marı´a from preventing
the child’s drowning (double prevention) than if Juan had merely let the
child drown without preventing someone else from saving it (omission).
However, Juan is less deserving of blame for preventing Marı´a from
saving the drowning child (double prevention) than if Juan had drowned
90. The norms that are created to implement a sliding scale approach to human conduct
would more closely resemble “standards” than “rules.” A standard is a norm that does not apply in
an all-or-nothing fashion. Standards give the decision maker discretion to decide a case on the
basis of a number of factors that must be balanced. The way in which the balance is struck may
differ from decision maker to decision maker and, therefore, application of the standard is not
outcome determinative in the same way as application of a rule is. See generally Pierre Schlag,
Rules and Standards, 33 UCLA L. REV. 379, 383–90 (1985).
91. See MICHAEL S. MOORE, CAUSATION AND RESPONSIBILITY: AN ESSAY IN LAW, MORALS,
AND METAPHYSICS 459–60 (2009).
92. Id.
93. Moore discusses “double preventions” generally. I came up with this hypothetical in order
to explain the concept.
\\jciprod01\productn\M\MIA\69-1\MIA109.txt unknown Seq: 28 25-NOV-14 8:45
188 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 69:161
the child (action). If this were correct, the sliding scale of blameworthi-
ness in these cases would look like this:
Most Blameworthy: Juan drowns the child (action)
Intermediate Blameworthiness: Juan prevents Marı´a from preventing
death of drowning child (double prevention)
Least Blameworthy: Juan lets the child drown but does not prevent
anyone else from trying to save the child (omission)
The criminal law’s all-or-nothing approach to human conduct is
also undermined by cases that share the structure of Judith Jarvis Thom-
son’s famous violinist example. As Jarvis Thomson describes the case,
[y]ou wake up in the morning and find yourself back to back in bed
with an unconscious violinist. A famous unconscious violinist. He
has been found to have a fatal kidney ailment, and the Society of
Music Lovers has canvassed all the available medical records and
found that you alone have the right blood type to help. They have
therefore kidnapped you, and last night the violinist’s circulatory sys-
tem was plugged into yours, so that your kidneys can be used to
extract poisons from his blood as well as your own. . . . To unplug
you would be to kill him. . . . [But, in nine months] he will have
recovered from his ailment, and can safely be unplugged from you.94
While Jarvis Thomson invokes the violinist thought experiment to
ask whether it is morally permissible for the person to unplug herself
from the violinist,95 I believe the case raises a distinct—although interre-
lated—question. If the person unplugs herself from the violinist, has she
killed the violinist or merely let him die? On the one hand, the person
has engaged in a willed bodily movement that causally contributes to the
violinist’s death (unplugging herself from his body). This description of
the facts sounds like an action and, consequently, like “killing” the vio-
linist. On the other hand, by unplugging herself, the person has allowed
the violinist to die as a result of his ailment and, therefore, has let the
violinist die. This sounds more like passive conduct.
Once again, I submit that unplugging yourself from the violinist is
more worthy of condemnation than merely refusing to plug yourself to
the violinist in the first place. In contrast, I argue that unplugging from
the violinist is less blameworthy than actively killing the violinist by, for
example, injecting him with poison. Moreover, I posit that it is odd to
describe the conduct in this thought experiment as purely active or
purely omissive. In order to fully capture the moral complexity of the
fact-pattern, it is necessary to take into account both the act of unplug-
ging and how the act may be construed as a failure to provide suste-
94. Thomson, supra note 6, at 48–49. R
95. Jarvis Thomson believes that it is permissible to unplug yourself from the violinist. Id. at
61–62.
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nance. Once both the active and passive features of the conduct are
given their due, the full blameworthiness of the conduct comes into full
view:
Most Blameworthy: You inject violinist with poison (action)
Intermediate Blameworthiness: You unplug yourself from the violin-
ist (both action and omission)
Least Blameworthy: You refuse to plug yourself to the violinist
(omission)
While the violinist case is concededly an extravagant example, it
is—as Jarvis Thomson argues—similar to other cases that are of signifi-
cant practical import. According to Jarvis Thomson, unplugging yourself
from the violinist is similar to aborting a fetus.96 While not identical, the
cases are similar, for abortion entails engaging in active conduct that
may be construed as a failure to continue providing sustenance to the
fetus.97 Looking at abortion as a course of conduct that shares morally
relevant features of both acts and omissions may explain why killing a
fetus is less blameworthy than killing a born child, even if one assumes
that the fetus is as much of a person as the born child is.98 Aborting the
fetus is less blameworthy than killing a child because the former is plau-
sibly construed as a failure to continue providing sustenance, whereas
the latter cannot be. While both aborting a fetus and killing a child entail
engaging in active conduct, the full meaning of an abortion can only be
grasped when it is placed within the broader context of omission. The
fetus dies because the mother no longer wishes to sustain it. This failure
to provide sustenance is an omission.
With few exceptions, most scholars have failed to grasp the (par-
tially) omissive nature of abortions. This infelicitous failure reflects the
pervasiveness of the all-or-nothing approach to human conduct. The
standard approach goes something like this: Either the mother killed the
fetus or she let it die. Given that abortion may only be accomplished by
engaging in a willed bodily movement, aborting a fetus is the same as
actively killing the fetus. But there is no need to pigeonhole the mother’s
96. Id. at 48–49.
97. See, e.g., SHERRY F. COLB, MIND IF I ORDER THE CHEESEBURGER? AND OTHER
QUESTIONS PEOPLE ASK VEGANS 87–91 (2013) (posing a hypothetical scenario where a
developing embryo and fetus can be housed in an incubator up until the twenty-fourth week of
pregnancy, and contemplating the moral choices this would present at the end of the twenty-fourth
week).
98. I take no position here regarding whether a fetus ought to be considered a “person.” Even
assuming that the fetus is a person, I argue that killing a fetus is not a case of purely active
wrongdoing, but rather an “actmission” that consists of engaging in a willed bodily movement that
amounts to a failure to continue providing sustenance. As such, an abortion shares morally
relevant features of both acts and omissions. This alone is enough to conclude that the abortion of
a fetus is, ceteris paribus, less blameworthy than the killing of a born child.
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conduct as either wholly active and therefore highly blameworthy, or
wholly passive and not particularly worthy of blame. If the current all-
or-nothing approach to human conduct were replaced with a more flexi-
ble sliding scale approach, one might simply conclude that aborting a
fetus is not as blameworthy as killing a person, but more blameworthy
than failing to save a person. This reframing of the intractable abortion
issue is worthy of discussion.
While a sliding-scale approach to human conduct describes in
richer and more accurate detail our moral intuitions regarding a broad
array of conduct, it is difficult to implement as law. Adoption of the
sliding scale approach is impractical, for judges are not well equipped to
decide where a particular case falls within the continuum that occupies
the space between fully active and fully omissive conduct. Furthermore,
even if decision makers are equipped to make such determinations,
replacing the neat act/omission distinction with a concededly more neb-
ulous sliding scale of human conduct may generate more problems than
it solves. It may lead, for example, to similar cases being treated differ-
ently solely based on how different judges balance the competing fac-
tors. Additionally, adopting a sliding scale of human conduct may run
afoul of the fair warning requirement, for a person could plausibly argue
that the laundry list of factors that judges would take into account when
determining how to classify the conduct do not provide individuals with
ex ante fair notice regarding how their conduct will be treated by the
courts.99
B. A More Modest Proposal: Towards the Act/Omission/Actmission
Tristinction
Although the sliding scale approach to human conduct provides a
better framework for fully grasping the moral complexity of the Evil
Waiter Case, the violinist example, and instances of double prevention,
there are good pragmatic reasons against replacing the act/omission dis-
tinction with the more ill-defined sliding scale approach. Considerations
of fair warning counsel in favor of more precision in defining the human
conduct requirement than what is provided by the sliding scale
approach. Furthermore, judges likely need more guidance than what the
sliding scale approach affords. In spite of this, there are still good rea-
sons to abandon the act/omission distinction. As the Evil Waiter Case
99. See supra note 7. See also Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 162 (1972)
(citing United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612 (1954)) (stating that a law does not satisfy
constitutional fair warning requirements and is void for vagueness when it “‘fails to give a person
of ordinary intelligence fair notice that his contemplated conduct is forbidden by the statute,’ and
because it encourages arbitrary and erratic arrests and convictions”).
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and the rest of the cases discussed in Part II of this essay reveal, the act/
omission distinction simply fails to fully explain the blameworthiness
inherent in a non-negligible number of scenarios.
But if the sliding scale approach is too ill-defined to warrant adop-
tion and the act/omission dichotomy is overly simplistic, is there an
attractive compromise? I believe there is. The act/omission distinction
ought to be replaced with an act/omission/actmission tristinction. Recog-
nizing actmissions as a distinct course of conduct in addition to acts and
omissions better accounts for cases like the violinist example, the Evil
Waiter Case, and double preventions, without sacrificing too much pre-
cision in the manner that adoption of the sliding scale approach would
require. As I explained in Part I, a course of conduct counts as an
actmission when a willed bodily movement results in a failure to rescue.
This is what happens in the Evil Waiter Case, for she engages in a willed
bodily movement (placing dish in front of patron) that results in a failure
to rescue the patron. Double prevention cases present a similar structure.
When Juan restrains Marı´a, he engages in a willed bodily movement that
results in the failure to rescue the drowning child. Finally, abortion
amounts to a failure to continue providing sustenance to the fetus that is
accomplished by a willed bodily movement.
As I have argued before, these actmissions are more blameworthy
than pure omissions but less worthy of condemnation than pure
actions.100 Placing the dish in front of the patron is more blameworthy
than simply failing to rescue the patron but less wrongful than poisoning
the patron. Juan’s restraining of Marı´a is more deserving of blame than
merely failing to do something to save the drowning child, but less
blameworthy than actively drowning the child. Finally, aborting a fetus
is less worthy of condemnation than killing a born child, while more
worthy of condemnation than merely failing to rescue a child. Describ-
ing these courses of conduct as actmissions calibrates the blameworthi-
ness that ought to attach in each of these cases more accurately than
describing these fact patterns as either acts or omissions. Furthermore,
the definition of actmissions provided in this article is sufficiently spe-
cific to satisfy constitutional fair warning requirements.101 This, in turn,
provides us with compelling reasons for replacing the act/omission dis-
tinction with an act/omission/actmission tristinction.
100. See supra notes 77–85 and accompanying text; see also Chiesa, supra note 4, at 606
(“Recall that actmissions are more blameworthy than pure omissions but less worthy of
condemnation than full-fledged affirmative actions.”).
101. See supra notes 7, 99.
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IV. CONCLUSION
The Evil Waiter Case and other cases that share a similar structure
expose an important shortcoming in American criminal law: the act/
omission distinction cannot fully account for the blameworthiness of
these scenarios. In order to fully grasp their moral complexity, it is nec-
essary to acknowledge that they present courses of conduct that share
relevant features of both acts and omissions. If these cases feature
neither active nor omissive conduct, it would be tempting to move from
the rigid act/omission distinction to a more flexible sliding scale of
human conduct. Such a radical revision of criminal law is nevertheless
ill-advised. Replacing the act/omission distinction with a nebulous slid-
ing scale that allows the decision maker to place courses of conduct
somewhere along a spectrum that goes from full-fledged action to pure
omission would likely fail to provide the specificity that fair warning
requires. This does not mean, however, that the criminal law ought to
maintain the act/omission distinction. There is a more attractive interme-
diate position that better accounts for cases like the Evil Waiter Case
without running afoul of the fair warning requirement. American crimi-
nal law ought to recognize “actmissions” as a distinct category of con-
duct. Such actmissions should be punished more than pure omissions but
less than purely active conduct.
